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Mary O’Sullivan’s new book represents an important and highly persuasive revisionist contribution to economic and financial history. She studies the evolution of markets for corporate securities in the United States from after the Civil War to the early 1920s and clearly signals her broad conclusion in the book’s title: it was ‘… the dramatic and unstable character of the nation’s economic development that explains the dynamics of the US securities markets’ (p. 360). Her exploration of the factors driving the supply of and demand for industrial securities leads her to take issue with those economists who ‘… tend to argue that securities markets lead the process of economic development’ (p. 363). She therefore drives further nails into the coffin of the historical validity of the law and finance view in arguing that legal and political institutions were less important than economic developments in the evolution of the US securities markets. In another significant corrective, she finds that the role of the financial elite of the ‘money trust’ headed by J.P. Morgan and others was less influential than almost invariably claimed.

	A time-constrained reader would capture the book’s essence from the ‘Introduction’ and chapter one, which set out its approach and structure and summarise its main arguments, but it would be a shame to miss the rich contents which follow. Thereafter, the book is essentially arranged chronologically. Chapter two focuses on Anglo-American brewing securities listed and traded in London in the late nineteenth century. These securities found a ready demand, although their investment performance was undermined by high valuations and weak company performance. O’Sullivan concludes that this demand in part reflected the London Stock Exchange’s more robust gatekeeping function, contradicting the consensus that the listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were stricter. The NYSE’s various attempts to tighten its standards feature throughout the book but typically foundered on the actual or feared migration of trading to the less heavily-regulated Curb market.

The next three chapters deal with the domestic markets for US securities in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. These markets tended to attract companies which needed capital, or whose promoters wanted to realize their investments, rather than those that had good prospects. Active trading in industrial securities was limited to a handful of stocks, with narrow, thin markets for most. Corporate disclosure was poor, highlighted in the failure of the National Cordage Company in 1893 which triggered a panic. Booms in resource stocks and other industrial securities associated with the merger movement at the start of the twentieth century collapsed. These weaknesses were compounded by New York’s call market, which banks and trust companies used to lend surplus funds from around the nation secured on the collateral of securities, often to the members of underwriting syndicates who took up new issues. When stock prices and trading volumes rose, so new issues came to market and lending standards relaxed, fuelling the speculative demand for corporate securities, a process which reversed itself more than once. Chapter five builds towards the 1907 panic with the narrative pace and excitement of J.K. Galbraith’s The Great Crash 1929 (revised edition, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975; first published 1954), but with more robust referencing. Outcry and actual or planned reforms followed this panic, and chapter six deals with these, highlighting the financier Paul Warburg’s role in articulating and advocating a model which was largely realized in the creation of the Federal Reserve. In the following chapter O’Sullivan builds on the preceding, using a range of original sources to expose ‘serious limits to the evidentiary basis for the claims made in the Pujo report about the extent, the basis and the impact of the money trust’ (p. 310). 

Chapter eight addresses World War One and its immediate aftermath, when the ‘broad and liquid’ market which economists cherish was finally achieved in industrial securities. The number, quality, range, valuations and trading volumes of industrial stocks all increased. Volumes in stocks at last matched those in bonds, trading in industrial stocks was far less concentrated, and the railroads no longer dominated. Sound industrial companies came to market during wartime and enjoyed good postwar prospects after the speculative postwar boom subsided. Stockholder numbers nearly doubled from 1913 to 1923, adding to the demand from institutional investors, who were dominated by life insurers who had traditionally preferred railroad securities, especially bonds. But the persistence of the call market after the establishment of the Federal Reserve, which was supposed to replace it with a European-style discount market, left in place the roots for future disaster. O’Sullivan reiterates her conclusions in a brief final chapter: there was no whigish inevitability about the nature of the markets which emerged after World War One despite the ascent of American business.

In her preface, O’Sullivan explains how she reconceived this book, which considerably extended its writing. It was worth the wait. Scope remains for her originally-planned book on ‘how different industries used the securities markets’ (p. vii), although she has published some of this material in article form. Such a book would reinforce some of her arguments, notably that many of those industrial companies which used the securities markets were of lower quality than those which did not. There are other gaps to fill. For example, O’Sullivan concentrates on the largest US markets, the NYSE and the Curb, with less frequent coverage of others such as Boston and Chicago. But she has done more than enough for a single book. Her conclusions are provocative, but not her style. She is tactfully, patiently and insistently critical of a range of scholars, historians, economists and others, many of them eminent, many still with us. This is rigorous, theoretically-informed history, which avoids bending facts to fit theories and chooses to ‘… interpret history in a forward-looking rather than backward-looking way’ (p. 12). Those who wish to contest her arguments will need to match her diligence in painstakingly revisiting an array of archival and other original sources, a formidable proposition. For the business historian there is much of interest and much to admire in this book, not only its findings, but also in its approach and fine demonstration of the historian’s craft.
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